Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts

Levent Koçkesen, Efe A. Ok

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case where only one party has the option to delegate, we analyse the possibility that strategic delegation arises as an equilibrium outcome under completely unobservable incentive contracts within the class of two-person extensive form games. We show that delegation may arise solely due to strategic reasons in quite general economic environments even under unobservable contracts. Furthermore, under some reasonable restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and actions of the outside party, strategic delegation is shown to be the only equilibrium outcome.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)397-424
    Number of pages28
    JournalReview of Economic Studies
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - Apr 2004

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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