Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities

Olivier Bochet; Toyotaka Sakai

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.07.001

Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities

Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We provide various extensions of strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions and examine their impact on standard solutions. We show that some efficient and fair solutions, such as the envy-free solution, satisfy certain extensions of strategy-proofness. We also establish an impossibility result on extended strategy-proofness that is defined in terms of expected utility.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	53-68
Number of pages	16
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	53
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.07.001
State	Published - Jan 2007

Keywords

Extended strategy-proofness
Fair allocation
Indivisible goods
Stochastic choice
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.07.001

Cite this

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AB - This paper studies strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We provide various extensions of strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions and examine their impact on standard solutions. We show that some efficient and fair solutions, such as the envy-free solution, satisfy certain extensions of strategy-proofness. We also establish an impossibility result on extended strategy-proofness that is defined in terms of expected utility.

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KW - Fair allocation

KW - Indivisible goods

KW - Stochastic choice

KW - Strategy-proofness

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Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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