Strategic tournaments

Ayala Arad; Ariel Rubinstein

doi:10.1257/mic.5.4.31

Strategic tournaments

Ayala Arad, Ariel Rubinstein

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behavior.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	31-54
Number of pages	24
Journal	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume	5
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.4.31
State	Published - Nov 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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10.1257/mic.5.4.31

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Strategic tournaments

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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