Strategic tournaments

Ayala Arad, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behavior.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)31-54
    Number of pages24
    JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
    Volume5
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 2013

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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