TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategy choice in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
AU - Dal Bó, Pedro
AU - Fréchette, Guillaume R.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/11
Y1 - 2019/11
N2 - We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies repre- sent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round-by-round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions.
AB - We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies repre- sent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round-by-round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions.
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.20181480
DO - 10.1257/aer.20181480
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85076023829
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 109
SP - 3929
EP - 3952
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 11
ER -