Strategy choice in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume R. Fréchette

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies repre- sent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round-by-round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)3929-3952
    Number of pages24
    JournalAmerican Economic Review
    Volume109
    Issue number11
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 2019

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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