Strengthening international courts and the early settlement of disputes

Michael Gilligan, Leslie Johns, B. Peter Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    How does variation in the strength of a court's jurisdiction and enforcement affect strategic behavior by states involved in international disputes? The authors construct a formal model and identify three important ways that legal institutions can have a deleterious effect on international cooperation by magnifying the bargaining problems arising from incomplete information about the quality of the legal claims. First, strong courts create less information revelation in pretrial bargaining. Second, strong courts reduce the likelihood of pretrial settlements between states. Third, strong courts lead to more brinksmanship over high-value assets, which leads to conflict if the court refuses to intervene. The authors argue that a key policy implication of their model is that attempts to strengthen international courts must be accompanied by increased precision of international law to ameliorate the deleterious effects of strong courts.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)5-38
    Number of pages34
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Volume54
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 2010

    Keywords

    • Dispute settlement
    • Enforcement
    • International court
    • International organization
    • Jurisdiction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

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