Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames

A. Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    The set of payoffs for the strong equilibria is characterized for supergames when the evaluation relations are according to the limit of the means and where no coalition can correlate its strategies in a randomized way. It is proven that this set is identical to the set of payoffs of the strong perfect equilibria. On the other hand an example is given to demonstrate that perfection is a significant notion in supergames where the evaluation relations are according to the overtaking criterion.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1-12
    Number of pages12
    JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - Mar 1980

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics and Probability
    • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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