Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs

Yurid Nugraha; Tomohisa Hayakawa; Ahmet Cetinkaya; Hideaki Ishii; Quanyan Zhu

doi:10.23919/acc.2019.8814607

Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs

Yurid Nugraha, Tomohisa Hayakawa, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Hideaki Ishii, Quanyan Zhu

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. We provide a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis and fully characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to the multiagent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	2060-2065
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781538679265
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.23919/acc.2019.8814607
State	Published - Jul 2019
Event	2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019 - Philadelphia, United States Duration: Jul 10 2019 → Jul 12 2019

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the American Control Conference
Volume	2019-July
ISSN (Print)	0743-1619

Conference

Conference	2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
Country/Territory	United States
City	Philadelphia
Period	7/10/19 → 7/12/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.23919/acc.2019.8814607

Cite this

Nugraha, Y., Hayakawa, T., Cetinkaya, A., Ishii, H., & Zhu, Q. (2019). Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs. In 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019 (pp. 2060-2065). Article 8814607 (Proceedings of the American Control Conference; Vol. 2019-July). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/acc.2019.8814607

Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs. / Nugraha, Yurid; Hayakawa, Tomohisa; Cetinkaya, Ahmet et al.
2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 2060-2065 8814607 (Proceedings of the American Control Conference; Vol. 2019-July).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Nugraha, Y, Hayakawa, T, Cetinkaya, A, Ishii, H & Zhu, Q 2019, Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs. in 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019., 8814607, Proceedings of the American Control Conference, vol. 2019-July, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2060-2065, 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019, Philadelphia, United States, 7/10/19. https://doi.org/10.23919/acc.2019.8814607

@inproceedings{74e61e1532a3467e98f0daaf2947f9c5,

title = "Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs",

abstract = "A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. We provide a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis and fully characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to the multiagent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process.",

author = "Yurid Nugraha and Tomohisa Hayakawa and Ahmet Cetinkaya and Hideaki Ishii and Quanyan Zhu",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 American Automatic Control Council.; 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019 ; Conference date: 10-07-2019 Through 12-07-2019",

year = "2019",

month = jul,

doi = "10.23919/acc.2019.8814607",

language = "English (US)",

series = "Proceedings of the American Control Conference",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

pages = "2060--2065",

booktitle = "2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs

AU - Nugraha, Yurid

AU - Hayakawa, Tomohisa

AU - Cetinkaya, Ahmet

AU - Ishii, Hideaki

AU - Zhu, Quanyan

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. We provide a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis and fully characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to the multiagent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process.

AB - A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. We provide a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis and fully characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to the multiagent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85061985834&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85061985834&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.23919/acc.2019.8814607

DO - 10.23919/acc.2019.8814607

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85061985834

T3 - Proceedings of the American Control Conference

SP - 2060

EP - 2065

BT - 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019

Y2 - 10 July 2019 through 12 July 2019

ER -

Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this