Abstract
This chapter addresses the following question: 'Is the minimal sufficient condition for the possession of a capacity to think of oneself as oneself also a minimal sufficient condition for the possession of a self?' It examines a number of thinkers who have answered this question in the affirmative, both in the recent Western phenomenological tradition and among the schools of classical India. It tries to establish whether there are any good reasons for answering in the negative.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Self, No Self? |
Subtitle of host publication | Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191595691 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199593804 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1 2010 |
Keywords
- Asanga
- Manas
- Recanati
- Self
- Selfhood
- Strawson
- Subjectivity
- The first person
- Vasubandhu
- Zahavi
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)