To investigate the nature and limits of knowledge, epistemologists often consult intuitions about whether people can be said to have knowledge or, alternatively, to know particular propositions. This chapter identifies a problem with this method. Although the intuitions elicited via statements about “knowledge” and “knowing” are treated as interchangeable sources of evidence, these intuitions actually differ. Building on prior psychological evidence, the chapter hypothesizes that the epistemic state denoted by the noun “knowledge” is viewed as stronger (e.g. more certain, more reliable) than the epistemic state denoted by the verb “know.” This hypothesis was supported by the results of six studies that used a variety of methodologies and data sources (e.g. philosophical texts, naive participants’ intuitions). This research has significant implications for epistemology: The syntactic structure of the linguistic examples offered as evidence for epistemological claims may influence the extent to which these examples provide intuitive support for the relevant claim.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Number of pages||31|
|State||Published - Jan 1 2018|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)