TY - JOUR
T1 - Survey on Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning
T2 - Current Trends, Categorization, Applications, Research Challenges, and Future Prospects
AU - Hanif, Muhammad Abdullah
AU - Chattopadhyay, Nandish
AU - Ouni, Bassem
AU - Shafique, Muhammad
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 IEEE.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have emerged as a prominent set of algorithms for complex real-world applications. However, state-of-the-art DNNs require a significant amount of data and computational resources to train and generalize well for real-world scenarios. This dependence of DNN training on a large amount of computational and memory resources has increased the use of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) or third-party resources for training large models for complex applications. Specifically, the drift of the deep learning community towards self-supervised learning for learning better representations directly from large amounts of unlabeled data has amplified the computational and memory requirements for machine learning. On the one hand, the availability of MLaaS (or third-party resources) alleviates this issue. On the other hand, it opens up avenues for a new set of vulnerabilities, where an adversary (someone from a third party) can infect the model with malicious functionality that is triggered only with specific input patterns. Such attacks are usually referred to as Trojan or backdoor attacks and are very stealthy and hard to detect. In this paper, we highlight the complete attack surface that can be exploited to inject hidden malicious functionality (backdoors) in machine learning models. We classify the attacks into two major categories, i.e., poisoning attacks and non-poisoning attacks, and present state-of-the-art works related to each. Towards the end of the article, we highlight the limitations of existing techniques and cover some of the key challenges in developing stealthy and robust real-world backdoor attacks.
AB - Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have emerged as a prominent set of algorithms for complex real-world applications. However, state-of-the-art DNNs require a significant amount of data and computational resources to train and generalize well for real-world scenarios. This dependence of DNN training on a large amount of computational and memory resources has increased the use of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) or third-party resources for training large models for complex applications. Specifically, the drift of the deep learning community towards self-supervised learning for learning better representations directly from large amounts of unlabeled data has amplified the computational and memory requirements for machine learning. On the one hand, the availability of MLaaS (or third-party resources) alleviates this issue. On the other hand, it opens up avenues for a new set of vulnerabilities, where an adversary (someone from a third party) can infect the model with malicious functionality that is triggered only with specific input patterns. Such attacks are usually referred to as Trojan or backdoor attacks and are very stealthy and hard to detect. In this paper, we highlight the complete attack surface that can be exploited to inject hidden malicious functionality (backdoors) in machine learning models. We classify the attacks into two major categories, i.e., poisoning attacks and non-poisoning attacks, and present state-of-the-art works related to each. Towards the end of the article, we highlight the limitations of existing techniques and cover some of the key challenges in developing stealthy and robust real-world backdoor attacks.
KW - adversarial attacks
KW - backdoor attacks
KW - backdoor defenses
KW - clean-label attacks
KW - Deep learning
KW - DNNs
KW - dynamic
KW - image classification
KW - machine learning (ML)
KW - neural networks
KW - object detection
KW - security
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105005775843&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=105005775843&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ACCESS.2025.3571995
DO - 10.1109/ACCESS.2025.3571995
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:105005775843
SN - 2169-3536
VL - 13
SP - 93190
EP - 93221
JO - IEEE Access
JF - IEEE Access
ER -