Talking ourselves to efficiency: Coordination in inter-generational minimum effort games with private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Ananish Chaudhuri, Andrew Schotter, Barry Sopher

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)91-122
    Number of pages32
    JournalEconomic Journal
    Volume119
    Issue number534
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2009

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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