TY - GEN
T1 - Tamper-resistant pin-constrained digital microfluidic biochips
AU - Tang, Jack
AU - Ibrahim, Mohamed
AU - Chakrabarty, Krishnendu
AU - Karri, Ramesh
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported in part by the Army Research Office under grant number ARO W911NF-17-1-0320. Ramesh Karri and Jack Tang are associated with the NYU Center for Cyber Security (cyber.nyu.edu). Ramesh Karri is also associated with the NYU-AD Center for Cyber Security (sites.nyuad.nyu.edu/ccs-ad/).
PY - 2018/6/24
Y1 - 2018/6/24
N2 - Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs)-an emerging technology that implements bioassays through manipulation of discrete fluid droplets-are vulnerable to actuation tampering attacks, where a malicious adversary modifies control signals for the purposes of manipulating results or causing denial-of-service. Such attacks leverage the highly programmable nature of DMFBs. However, practical DMFBs often employ a technique called pin mapping to reduce control pin count while simultaneously reducing the degrees of freedom available for droplet manipulation. Attempts to control specific electrodes as part of an attack cannot be made without inadvertently actuating other electrodes on-chip, which makes the tampering evident. This paper explores this tamperresistance property of pin mapping in detail. We derive relevant security metrics, evaluate the tamper-resistance of several existing pin mapping algorithms, and propose a new security-aware pin mapper with superior tamper-resistance as compared to prior work.
AB - Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs)-an emerging technology that implements bioassays through manipulation of discrete fluid droplets-are vulnerable to actuation tampering attacks, where a malicious adversary modifies control signals for the purposes of manipulating results or causing denial-of-service. Such attacks leverage the highly programmable nature of DMFBs. However, practical DMFBs often employ a technique called pin mapping to reduce control pin count while simultaneously reducing the degrees of freedom available for droplet manipulation. Attempts to control specific electrodes as part of an attack cannot be made without inadvertently actuating other electrodes on-chip, which makes the tampering evident. This paper explores this tamperresistance property of pin mapping in detail. We derive relevant security metrics, evaluate the tamper-resistance of several existing pin mapping algorithms, and propose a new security-aware pin mapper with superior tamper-resistance as compared to prior work.
KW - Digital microfluidics
KW - Electrode addressing
KW - Security
KW - Tamper-resistance
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U2 - 10.1145/3195970.3196125
DO - 10.1145/3195970.3196125
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85053657580
SN - 9781450357005
T3 - Proceedings - Design Automation Conference
BT - Proceedings of the 55th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 55th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC 2018
Y2 - 24 June 2018 through 29 June 2018
ER -