TY - JOUR
T1 - Targeting in-kind transfers through market design
T2 - A revealed preference analysis of public housing allocation
AU - Waldinger, Daniel
N1 - Funding Information:
I am grateful to Nikhil Agarwal, Parag Pathak, Michael Whinston, and Amy Finkelstein for invaluable guidance and support. I also thank Nick Arnosti, Glenn Ellison, Ingrid Gould-Ellen, Tatiana Homonoff, John Lazarev, Jacob Leshno, Peng Shi, Paulo Somaini, Neil Thakral, and Heidi Williams; seminar participants at the MIT Industrial Organization and Public Finance workshops, and at several other universities; and my colleagues at NYU. Suggestions from four anonymous referees greatly improved the paper. The Cambridge Housing Authority generously provided the applicant and tenant data used in this paper, with special thanks to Tara Aubuchon, Tito Evora, Michael Johnston, Jay Leslie, Hannah Lodi, and John Ziniewicz. All analysis and views expressed in this paper are my own and do not represent the views of the Cambridge Housing Authority. I acknowledge support from a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. All mistakes are my own.
Funding Information:
* Department of Economics, New York University (email: danielwaldinger@nyu.edu). Liran Einav was the coeditor for this article. I am grateful to Nikhil Agarwal, Parag Pathak, Michael Whinston, and Amy Finkelstein for invaluable guidance and support. I also thank Nick Arnosti, Glenn Ellison, Ingrid Gould-Ellen, Tatiana Homonoff, John Lazarev, Jacob Leshno, Peng Shi, Paulo Somaini, Neil Thakral, and Heidi Williams; seminar participants at the MIT Industrial Organization and Public Finance workshops, and at several other universities; and my colleagues at NYU. Suggestions from four anonymous referees greatly improved the paper. The Cambridge Housing Authority generously provided the applicant and tenant data used in this paper, with special thanks to Tara Aubuchon, Tito Evora, Michael Johnston, Jay Leslie, Hannah Lodi, and John Ziniewicz. All analysis and views expressed in this paper are my own and do not represent the views of the Cambridge Housing Authority. I acknowledge support from a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. All mistakes are my own.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/8
Y1 - 2021/8
N2 - Public housing benefits are rationed through wait lists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using wait list data from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution.
AB - Public housing benefits are rationed through wait lists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using wait list data from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution.
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.20190516
DO - 10.1257/aer.20190516
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85111768209
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 111
SP - 2660
EP - 2696
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 8
ER -