Abstract
This paper examines a two-sector small open economy that is subject to shocks in its terms-of-trade. Risk-neutral entrepreneurs use implicit contracts to insure risk-averse workers against fluctuations in their income. The characteristics of these contracts are examined within a general equilibrium framework and the implications for employment, wages and utility of different realizations of relative prices are analyzed. The implicit contract equilibrium is shown to be constrained Pareto optimal when the social planner is unable to provide income directly to unemployed workers. -Author
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 881-894 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | International Economic Review |
Volume | 33 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1992 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics