The buck-passing account of value: Lessons from Crisp

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T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buck-passing account of value.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)421-432
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 2010


  • Buck-passing account of value
  • Reasons and value
  • Roger Crisp
  • T. M. Scanlon

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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