We axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are linear in every rank-ordered subset of Rn+. Such functions, the so-called Choquet integrals, have been widely used in the theories of collective and individual choice. We refer to bargaining solutions that can be rationalized by Choquet integrals as Choquet bargaining solutions. Our main result is a complete characterization of Choquet bargaining solutions. As a corollary of our main result, we also obtain a characterization of the generalized Gini bargaining solutions introduced by Blackorby et al. (1994, Econometrica62, 1161-1178). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, C78.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||16|
|Journal||Games and Economic Behavior|
|State||Published - Nov 2000|
- Axiomatic bargaining theory; Choquet integral generalized Ginis
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics