TY - GEN
T1 - The Cognitive Processes Underlying Moral Judgment Across Development
AU - Chalik, Lisa
AU - Van Bavel, Jay J.
AU - Rhodes, Marjorie
N1 - Funding Information:
We are very grateful to the families and staff at the Children's Museum of Manhattan, and to the members of the NYU Conceptual Development and Social Cognition Lab. Funding was provided by NSF BCS-1226942, NSF BCS-1147543, and NSF BCS-1349089.
Funding Information:
We are very grateful to the families and staff at the Children’s Museum of Manhattan, and to the members of the NYU Conceptual Development and Social Cognition Lab. Funding was provided by NSF BCS-1226942, NSF BCS-1147543, and NSF BCS-1349089.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2018. All rights reserved.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Some moral philosophers have suggested that a basic prohibition against intentional harm ought to be at the core of moral belief systems across human societies. Yet, experimental work suggests that not all harm is viewed equally-people often respond more negatively to harm that occurs among fellow social group members, rather than between members of different groups. The present two studies investigated how concerns about social group membership factor into the moral judgment system. Adults (N = 111, Study 1) and children (N = 110, Study 2) evaluated instances of inter- and intra-group harm under varying levels of cognitive load. Both children and adults responded more slowly to intergroup harm than to intragroup harm. Furthermore, adults under cognitive load rated intergroup harm more leniently than intragroup harm, but adults who were not under load rated the two types of behaviors similarly. These findings suggest that across development, evaluations of intergroup harm rely more heavily on conscious deliberation than evaluations of intragroup harm. Thus, people's evaluations of harmful behaviors are made in light of information about the social category membership of the people involved.
AB - Some moral philosophers have suggested that a basic prohibition against intentional harm ought to be at the core of moral belief systems across human societies. Yet, experimental work suggests that not all harm is viewed equally-people often respond more negatively to harm that occurs among fellow social group members, rather than between members of different groups. The present two studies investigated how concerns about social group membership factor into the moral judgment system. Adults (N = 111, Study 1) and children (N = 110, Study 2) evaluated instances of inter- and intra-group harm under varying levels of cognitive load. Both children and adults responded more slowly to intergroup harm than to intragroup harm. Furthermore, adults under cognitive load rated intergroup harm more leniently than intragroup harm, but adults who were not under load rated the two types of behaviors similarly. These findings suggest that across development, evaluations of intergroup harm rely more heavily on conscious deliberation than evaluations of intragroup harm. Thus, people's evaluations of harmful behaviors are made in light of information about the social category membership of the people involved.
KW - intergroup cognition
KW - moral judgment
KW - social cognitive development
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85088661173
T3 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2018
SP - 1464
EP - 1469
BT - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2018
PB - The Cognitive Science Society
T2 - 40th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Changing Minds, CogSci 2018
Y2 - 25 July 2018 through 28 July 2018
ER -