The directional attack on wireless localization - or - How to spoof your location with a tin can

Kevin Bauer, Damon McCoy, Eric Anderson, Markus Breitenbach, Greg Grudic, Dirk Grunwald, Douglas Sicker

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    802.11 localization algorithms provide the ability to accurately position and track wireless clients thereby enabling location-based services and applications. However, we show that these localization techniques are vulnerable to non-cryptographic attacks where an adversary uses a low-cost directional antenna to appear from the localization algorithm's perspective to be in another arbitrary location of their choosing. The attacker's ability to actively influence where they are positioned is a key distinguishing feature of the directional attack relative to prior localization attacks that use transmit power control to introduce localization errors. We implement a representative set of received signal strength-based localization algorithms and evaluate the attack in a real office building environment. To mitigate the attack's effectiveness, we develop and evaluate an attack detection scheme that offers a high detection rate with few false positives.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationGLOBECOM 2009 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2009
    Event2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009 - Honolulu, HI, United States
    Duration: Nov 30 2009Dec 4 2009

    Publication series

    NameGLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

    Other

    Other2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009
    CountryUnited States
    CityHonolulu, HI
    Period11/30/0912/4/09

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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