The dynamics of wealth distribution with asymmetric incentives and endogenous matching

Alessandro Citanna

doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0133-3

The dynamics of wealth distribution with asymmetric incentives and endogenous matching

Alessandro Citanna

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In a dynastic economy with warm-glow bequest individuals can form firms in a frictionless matching market. Contracts within firms are subject to moral hazard. Production tasks differ in incentive intensity and the matching market is open until production takes place. The credit market is perfect. In a principal-agent context, we examine the long-run effects on the wealth distribution, and show the presence of hysteresis and poverty traps.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	243-261
Number of pages	19
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	33
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0133-3
State	Published - Nov 2007

Keywords

Incentive
Matching market
Poverty traps

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-006-0133-3

Cite this

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The dynamics of wealth distribution with asymmetric incentives and endogenous matching

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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