The effect of selective INS monitoring strategies on the industrial employment choice and earnings of recent immigrants

Alberto Dávila, José A. Pagán

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

One effect of 1986's immigration reform was to make INS inspection of farms more costly relative to other industries. In response, we suggest, the INS refocused its enforcement efforts toward industries with a higher concentration of illegals per establishment, especially manufacturing. We test this hypotheses and model the effects of a selective monitoring strategy on the employment choice and wages of illegal workers. We find evidence of selective monitoring by the INS and that this policy has redistributed illegal workers from closely to weakly monitored industries. Specifically, we find a shift from the higher-paying manufacturing sector to the agricultural.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)138-150
Number of pages13
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume35
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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