The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Ana B. Ania

doi:10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana B. Ania

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obtained are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	497-516
Number of pages	20
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	26
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8
State	Published - 2005

Keywords

Aggregative games
Evolutionarily stable strategy
Price-taking behavior
Stochastic stability
Supermodularity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

Cite this

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KW - Price-taking behavior

KW - Stochastic stability

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The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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