The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana B. Ania

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obtained are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)497-516
Number of pages20
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2005


  • Aggregative games
  • Evolutionarily stable strategy
  • Price-taking behavior
  • Stochastic stability
  • Supermodularity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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