The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching

Joyee Deb; Takuo Sugaya; Alexander Wolitzky

doi:10.3982/ECTA16680

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching

Joyee Deb, Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non-uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record-keeping or communication devices—including cheap talk communication and public randomization—are necessary.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	917-964
Number of pages	48
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	88
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16680
State	Published - May 1 2020

Keywords

folk theorem
random matching
Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.3982/ECTA16680

Cite this

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The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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