Abstract
Can a history of evasion affect tax compliance after a major institutional reform? We address this question in a novel laboratory experiment varying the quality of past and present institutions. We find that past institutions continue to exert considerable influence on individuals’ expectations about others’ compliance even after a major, common-knowledge institutional change. Consequently, we observe low compliance in good-quality institutions when there is a history of evasion, but high compliance when there is no such history. These findings suggest that history should not be ignored as it is in traditional models of compliance: the higher evasion has been historically, the stronger incentives may need to be to overcome the “ghost of institutions past”. We show that a society-wide poll in which individuals express their attitudes toward compliance can help break the link with the past.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 103641 |
Journal | European Economic Review |
Volume | 132 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2021 |
Keywords
- Experiment
- Interdependence
- Multiple equilibria
- Path dependence
- Tax evasion
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics