TY - JOUR
T1 - The impact of self-control depletion on social preferences in the ultimatum game
AU - Achtziger, Anja
AU - Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
AU - Wagner, Alexander K.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank two anonymous referees, Ido Erev, Urs Fischbacher, Peter Gollwitzer, Werner Güth, participants at the ESA conference at the University of Cologne, the IMEBE conference in Castellón, the Psychoeconomics Winter Workshop at the University of Konstanz, the TIBER conference at Tilburg University, and the Workshop on the Evolution of Social Preferences at the University of Vienna for helpful comments. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Research Initiative “Center for Psychoeconomics” at the University of Konstanz, funded within the German “Exzellenzinitiative”. Wagner also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through research fellowship WA3559/1-1.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2016/4/1
Y1 - 2016/4/1
N2 - We study the interaction of different motives and decision processes in determining behavior in the ultimatum game. We rely on an ego-depletion manipulation which consumes self-control resources, thereby enhancing the influence of default reactions, or in psychological terms, automatic processes. Experimental results provide evidence that proposers make higher offers under ego depletion. Based on findings from a closely related dictator game study, which shows that depleted dictators give less than non-depleted ones, we discard the possibility that other-regarding concerns are the default mode. Instead, we conclude that depleted proposers offer more because of a strategic 'fear of rejection' of low offers, consistent with self-centered monetary concerns. For responders, ego depletion increases the likelihood to accept offers, in line with unconditional monetary concerns being more automatic than affect-influenced reactions to reject unfair offers.
AB - We study the interaction of different motives and decision processes in determining behavior in the ultimatum game. We rely on an ego-depletion manipulation which consumes self-control resources, thereby enhancing the influence of default reactions, or in psychological terms, automatic processes. Experimental results provide evidence that proposers make higher offers under ego depletion. Based on findings from a closely related dictator game study, which shows that depleted dictators give less than non-depleted ones, we discard the possibility that other-regarding concerns are the default mode. Instead, we conclude that depleted proposers offer more because of a strategic 'fear of rejection' of low offers, consistent with self-centered monetary concerns. For responders, ego depletion increases the likelihood to accept offers, in line with unconditional monetary concerns being more automatic than affect-influenced reactions to reject unfair offers.
KW - Ego depletion
KW - Self-control
KW - Social preferences
KW - Ultimatum game
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U2 - 10.1016/j.joep.2015.12.005
DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2015.12.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84954222751
SN - 0167-4870
VL - 53
SP - 1
EP - 16
JO - Journal of Economic Psychology
JF - Journal of Economic Psychology
ER -