The inevitability of the "paradox of redistribution" in the allocation of voting weights

Dietrich Fischer, Andrew Schotter

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    In voting bodies, when voting weights are reallocated, it may be observed that the voting power of some members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, increases while their voting weight decreases. By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a "paradox of redistribution" can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently large. Simulation results show that the paradox is quite frequent (up to 30 percent) and increases with n (at least for small n). Examples are given where the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices are not consistent in demonstrating the paradox.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)49-67
    Number of pages19
    JournalPublic Choice
    Volume33
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Sep 1978

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Economics and Econometrics

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