Abstract
Why do local governments sometimes hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? I argue that such mobilization efforts depend in part on the policy congruence between localities and their elected delegates in the legislature. I provide evidence consistent with this theory by examining how municipal governments in the United States respond to partisan and ideological mismatches with their state legislators - a common representational challenge. Using almost a decade of original panel data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states, I employ difference-in-differences and a regression discontinuity design to demonstrate that cities are significantly more likely to hire lobbyists when their districts elect non-co-partisan state representatives. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental mobilization in which local officials purchase advocacy to compensate for the preference gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel government.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 677-690 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | American Political Science Review |
Volume | 114 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1 2020 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations