TY - GEN
T1 - The pollution attack in P2P live video streaming
T2 - 2007 Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Streaming and IP-TV, P2P-TV'07
AU - Dhungel, Prithula
AU - Hei, Xiaojun
AU - Ross, Keith W.
AU - Saxena, Nitesh
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - P2P mesh-pull live video streaming applications - -such as Cool-Streaming, PPLive, and PPStream - - have become popular in the recent years. In this paper, we examine the stream pollution attack, for which the attacker mixes polluted chunks into the P2P distribution, degrading the quality of the rendered media at the receivers. Polluted chunks received by an unsuspecting peer not only effect that single peer, but since the peer also forwards chunks to other peers, and those peers in turn forward chunks to more peers, the polluted content can potentially spread through much of the P2P network. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, by way of experimenting and measuring a popular P2P live video streaming system, we show that the pollution attack can be devastating. Second, we evaluate the applicability of four possible defenses to the pollution attack: blacklisting, traffic encryption, hash verification, and chunk signing. Among these, we conclude that the chunk signing solutions are most suitable.
AB - P2P mesh-pull live video streaming applications - -such as Cool-Streaming, PPLive, and PPStream - - have become popular in the recent years. In this paper, we examine the stream pollution attack, for which the attacker mixes polluted chunks into the P2P distribution, degrading the quality of the rendered media at the receivers. Polluted chunks received by an unsuspecting peer not only effect that single peer, but since the peer also forwards chunks to other peers, and those peers in turn forward chunks to more peers, the polluted content can potentially spread through much of the P2P network. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, by way of experimenting and measuring a popular P2P live video streaming system, we show that the pollution attack can be devastating. Second, we evaluate the applicability of four possible defenses to the pollution attack: blacklisting, traffic encryption, hash verification, and chunk signing. Among these, we conclude that the chunk signing solutions are most suitable.
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U2 - 10.1145/1326320.1326324
DO - 10.1145/1326320.1326324
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:66649129942
SN - 9781595937896
T3 - Proceedings of the 2007 Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Streaming and IP-TV, P2P-TV'07
SP - 323
EP - 328
BT - Proceedings of the 2007 Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Streaming and IP-TV, P2P-TV'07
Y2 - 27 August 2007 through 31 August 2007
ER -