TY - JOUR
T1 - The potential of flexible reservations in a car sharing system with an auction scheme
AU - Roca-Riu, Mireia
AU - Menendez, Monica
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the Project CALog through the Hasler Foundation, in part by the NYUAD Center for Interacting Urban Networks (CITIES) through Tamkeen under the NYUAD Research Institute Award CG001, and through Swiss Re Institute under the Quantum Cities initiativeTM.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 IEEE.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In the last 20 years car sharing has been a growing trend in personal mobility. Multiple aspects of these systems have been already discussed: different forms of car sharing, user's preferences and behavior, or benefits estimation. Nevertheless, the management of these systems needs to be continuously improved to remain a competitive alternative. In this work, we propose a reservation scheme to manage rental reservations of a two-way station-based car sharing system. It allows the operator to better plan the necessary vehicles at each station, and encourages the drivers to make better use of the existing vehicles, by showing flexibility in the starting rental time. The reservation scheme is organized with an auction, where drivers bet for their preferred rental start time. Drivers participating in the auction are offered a reduced rental fare, which is then complemented with the reservation fee that results from the auction. The auction is solved under Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for combinatorial auctions, which guarantees the desired properties for the operator and a fair assignment for the drivers. The proposed scheme is tested on instances inspired by the Mobility car sharing system in Zürich, Switzerland. The results show that operators could decrease their fleets with low to no impacts on the overall rental revenues, especially when drivers show flexibility in their rental start times. For certain levels of demand price elasticity, even positive impacts on the overall rental revenues can be expected. Moreover, reservation fees are proven to partially compensate for the decrease in rental revenues provided to the auction users.
AB - In the last 20 years car sharing has been a growing trend in personal mobility. Multiple aspects of these systems have been already discussed: different forms of car sharing, user's preferences and behavior, or benefits estimation. Nevertheless, the management of these systems needs to be continuously improved to remain a competitive alternative. In this work, we propose a reservation scheme to manage rental reservations of a two-way station-based car sharing system. It allows the operator to better plan the necessary vehicles at each station, and encourages the drivers to make better use of the existing vehicles, by showing flexibility in the starting rental time. The reservation scheme is organized with an auction, where drivers bet for their preferred rental start time. Drivers participating in the auction are offered a reduced rental fare, which is then complemented with the reservation fee that results from the auction. The auction is solved under Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for combinatorial auctions, which guarantees the desired properties for the operator and a fair assignment for the drivers. The proposed scheme is tested on instances inspired by the Mobility car sharing system in Zürich, Switzerland. The results show that operators could decrease their fleets with low to no impacts on the overall rental revenues, especially when drivers show flexibility in their rental start times. For certain levels of demand price elasticity, even positive impacts on the overall rental revenues can be expected. Moreover, reservation fees are proven to partially compensate for the decrease in rental revenues provided to the auction users.
KW - Car sharing
KW - combinatorial auctions
KW - reservation system
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U2 - 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2948064
DO - 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2948064
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85074646056
SN - 2169-3536
VL - 7
SP - 154627
EP - 154639
JO - IEEE Access
JF - IEEE Access
M1 - 8873589
ER -