The probability of condorcet cycles and super majority rules

Yves Balasko; Hervé Crès

doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.2233

The probability of condorcet cycles and super majority rules

Yves Balasko, Hervé Crès

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionn!1-τ0.4714^n!.This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	237-270
Number of pages	34
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	75
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2233
State	Published - Aug 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.1996.2233

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title = "The probability of condorcet cycles and super majority rules",

abstract = "Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionn!1-τ0.4714n!.This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71.",

author = "Yves Balasko and Herv{\'e} Cr{\`e}s",

note = "Funding Information: * We thank an anonymous referee for an exceptionally insightful report. We thank C. Ghiglino, C. Lang, J. C. Manini, and K. Shell for helpful remarks and stimulating discussions. Support from the Swiss National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.",

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PY - 1997/8

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N2 - Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionn!1-τ0.4714n!.This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71.

AB - Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionn!1-τ0.4714n!.This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D71.

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The probability of condorcet cycles and super majority rules

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