The problem of apparently irrational beliefs

Steven Lukes

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    The problem of apparently irrational beliefs arises when one is confronted with another person who appears to believe what appears puzzling. The first use raises the issue of sincerely asserted belief. When people say puzzling things they could be joking or pretending or mimicking or free-associating or reciting or, in general, performing a wide range of acts while expressing themselves in the propositional language of belief. The problem of apparently irrational beliefs is a problem that raises, in turn, the question of relativism: of whether answering the question of what counts as rational, or non-puzzling, is relative to different perspectives, so that there is a plurality of correct and conflicting answers to it.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationPhilosophy of Anthropology and Sociology
    PublisherElsevier
    Pages591-606
    Number of pages16
    ISBN (Print)9780444515421
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2007

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences(all)

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The problem of apparently irrational beliefs'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this