TY - JOUR

T1 - The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness

AU - Klaus, Bettina

AU - Bochet, Olivier

N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2013/1

Y1 - 2013/1

N2 - The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller-Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new "Muller-Satterthwaite preference domains" (e. g., Proposition 3).

AB - The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller-Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new "Muller-Satterthwaite preference domains" (e. g., Proposition 3).

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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6

DO - 10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84872356163

VL - 40

SP - 41

EP - 63

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

IS - 1

ER -