The role of personal and impersonal relational contracts on partner selection and efficiency

Manuel Muñoz-Herrera, Ernesto Reuben

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this article, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of relational contracts on market efficiency in environments with different degrees of contract enforceability and market competition. By exogenously varying the communication protocol, we create relational contracts that are more personal or impersonal. On the one hand, personal relational contracts improve efficiency by promoting trust and coordination. On the other hand, impersonal relational contracts increase efficiency by facilitating the severance of trading relationships when more productive competitors enter the market. Therefore, the overall effect on market efficiency depends on the relative importance of competition and agreement enforceability (JEL D91, L22, L14).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)753-785
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Volume40
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2024

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Law

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