The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays

Josep Díaz, Ioannis Giotis, Lefteris Kirousis, Ioannis Mourtos, Maria Serna

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this study, we describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism incurs no additional cost, in contrast to tolls that typically differ from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)155-159
Number of pages5
JournalICT Express
Issue number4
StatePublished - 2017


  • Congestion games
  • Coordination mechanisms
  • Price of anarchy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Information Systems
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Artificial Intelligence


Dive into the research topics of 'The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this