TY - JOUR
T1 - The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
AU - Battaglini, Marco
AU - Morton, Rebecca B.
AU - Palfrey, Thomas R.
N1 - Funding Information:
Since when σB = σA = 0 we have Pr (P0 |A ) = Pr (PB |A ) = 0, Pr (P0 |B ) > 0, and Pr (PB |B ) > 0, we have uB − uφ > 0, which implies σB > 0. ‖ Acknowledgements. The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged by Battaglini (SES-0418150) and Palfrey (SES-0079301 and SES-0617820). The research was also supported by the PLESS, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Center for Economic Policy Studies. We thank Stephen Coate, David Austen-Smith, participants at the 2006 Wallis Political Economy Conference, especially Massimo Morelli, two anonymous referees for comments and an editor. Dustin Beckett, Karen Kaiser, Kyle Mattes and Stephanie Wang provided valuable research assistance.
PY - 2010/1
Y1 - 2010/1
N2 - This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on " pivotal voter" models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world. Our results support the equilibrium predictions of the Feddersen-Pesendorfer model. The voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter's curse and adjust their behaviour to compensate. While the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behaviour, we find that aggregate outcomes, such as efficiency, turnout and margin of victory, closely track the theoretical predictions.
AB - This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on " pivotal voter" models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world. Our results support the equilibrium predictions of the Feddersen-Pesendorfer model. The voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter's curse and adjust their behaviour to compensate. While the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behaviour, we find that aggregate outcomes, such as efficiency, turnout and margin of victory, closely track the theoretical predictions.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00569.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00569.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:73149104833
SN - 0034-6527
VL - 77
SP - 61
EP - 89
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
IS - 1
ER -