The 'trivial neuron doctrine' is not trivial

D. Jamieson

    Research output: Contribution to journalShort surveypeer-review


    I argue that the trivial neuron doctrine as characterized by Gold and Stoljar is not trivial; it appears to be inconsistent with property dualism as well as some forms of functionalism and externalism. I suggest that the problem is not so much with the particular way in which Gold and Stoljar draw the distinction as with the unruliness of the distinction itself. Their failure to see this may be why they misunderstand the views of the Churchlands.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)841-842
    Number of pages2
    JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
    Issue number5
    StatePublished - 1999

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
    • Physiology
    • Behavioral Neuroscience


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