The weight of reasons

Daniel Fogal, Olle Risberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be normatively fundamental, views which analyze reasons as evidence concerning what one ought to do, views which analyze reasons in terms of good reasoning, and views which analyze reasons as explanations of ought-facts, fittingness-facts, or goodness-facts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2573-2596
Number of pages24
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number9
StatePublished - Sep 2023


  • Normativity
  • Reasons
  • Support
  • Weighing
  • Weight

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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