Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions

Loukas Balafoutas; Kristoffel Grechenig; Nikos Nikiforakis

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.028

Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions

Loukas Balafoutas, Kristoffel Grechenig, Nikos Nikiforakis

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	308-310
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	122
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.028
State	Published - Feb 2014

Keywords

Counter-punishment
Norm enforcement
One-shot games
Third-party punishment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.028

Cite this

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title = "Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions",

abstract = "This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding.",

keywords = "Counter-punishment, Norm enforcement, One-shot games, Third-party punishment",

author = "Loukas Balafoutas and Kristoffel Grechenig and Nikos Nikiforakis",

note = "Funding Information: The experiments were funded by the Faculty of Business and Economics at the University of Melbourne, Nachwuchsf{\"o}rderung W-140403 from the University of Innsbruck , and the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn . We would like to thank Martin Pollet for programming the experiment, Brian Cooper for translating the instructions, and our research assistants Jan Sch{\"u}lting, Lukas Kiessling, and Florian Knaut for their support. ",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.028",

language = "English (US)",

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AU - Balafoutas, Loukas

AU - Grechenig, Kristoffel

AU - Nikiforakis, Nikos

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PY - 2014/2

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N2 - This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding.

AB - This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding.

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KW - Norm enforcement

KW - One-shot games

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Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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