TMO: A new class of attack on cipher misusing test infrastructure

Sk Subidh Ali; Ozgur Sinanoglu

doi:10.1109/VTS.2015.7116255

TMO: A new class of attack on cipher misusing test infrastructure

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

We present a new class of scan attack on hardware implementation of ciphers. The existing scan attacks on ciphers exploit the Design for Testability (DfT) infrastructure of the implementation, where an attacker applies cipher inputs in the functional mode and then by switching to the test mode retrieves the secret key in the form of test responses. These attacks can be thwarted by applying a reset operation when there is a switch of mode. However, the mode-reset countermeasure can be thwarted by using only the test mode of a secure chip. In this work we show how a Test-Mode-Only (TMO) attack can overcome the constraints imposed by a mode-reset countermeasure and demonstrate TMO attacks on private key as well as public key ciphers.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings - 2015 IEEE 33rd VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2015
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Electronic)	9781479975976
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/VTS.2015.7116255
State	Published - Jun 1 2015
Event	2015 33rd IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2015 - Napa, United States Duration: Apr 27 2015 → Apr 29 2015

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium
Volume	2015-January

Other

Other	2015 33rd IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2015
Country/Territory	United States
City	Napa
Period	4/27/15 → 4/29/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science Applications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/VTS.2015.7116255

Cite this

Ali, SS & Sinanoglu, O 2015, TMO: A new class of attack on cipher misusing test infrastructure. in Proceedings - 2015 IEEE 33rd VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2015., 7116255, Proceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, vol. 2015-January, IEEE Computer Society, 2015 33rd IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2015, Napa, United States, 4/27/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/VTS.2015.7116255

@inproceedings{b59227c9e27b4bb28cbce67d1b4e19e5,

title = "TMO: A new class of attack on cipher misusing test infrastructure",

abstract = "We present a new class of scan attack on hardware implementation of ciphers. The existing scan attacks on ciphers exploit the Design for Testability (DfT) infrastructure of the implementation, where an attacker applies cipher inputs in the functional mode and then by switching to the test mode retrieves the secret key in the form of test responses. These attacks can be thwarted by applying a reset operation when there is a switch of mode. However, the mode-reset countermeasure can be thwarted by using only the test mode of a secure chip. In this work we show how a Test-Mode-Only (TMO) attack can overcome the constraints imposed by a mode-reset countermeasure and demonstrate TMO attacks on private key as well as public key ciphers.",

author = "Ali, {Sk Subidh} and Ozgur Sinanoglu",

year = "2015",

month = jun,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1109/VTS.2015.7116255",

language = "English (US)",

series = "Proceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium",

publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",

booktitle = "Proceedings - 2015 IEEE 33rd VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2015",

note = "2015 33rd IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2015 ; Conference date: 27-04-2015 Through 29-04-2015",

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N2 - We present a new class of scan attack on hardware implementation of ciphers. The existing scan attacks on ciphers exploit the Design for Testability (DfT) infrastructure of the implementation, where an attacker applies cipher inputs in the functional mode and then by switching to the test mode retrieves the secret key in the form of test responses. These attacks can be thwarted by applying a reset operation when there is a switch of mode. However, the mode-reset countermeasure can be thwarted by using only the test mode of a secure chip. In this work we show how a Test-Mode-Only (TMO) attack can overcome the constraints imposed by a mode-reset countermeasure and demonstrate TMO attacks on private key as well as public key ciphers.

AB - We present a new class of scan attack on hardware implementation of ciphers. The existing scan attacks on ciphers exploit the Design for Testability (DfT) infrastructure of the implementation, where an attacker applies cipher inputs in the functional mode and then by switching to the test mode retrieves the secret key in the form of test responses. These attacks can be thwarted by applying a reset operation when there is a switch of mode. However, the mode-reset countermeasure can be thwarted by using only the test mode of a secure chip. In this work we show how a Test-Mode-Only (TMO) attack can overcome the constraints imposed by a mode-reset countermeasure and demonstrate TMO attacks on private key as well as public key ciphers.

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TMO: A new class of attack on cipher misusing test infrastructure

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