Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

Hervé Crès, M. Utku Ünver

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Consider a two-dimensional spatial voting model. A finite number m of voters are randomly drawn from a (weakly) symmetric distribution centered at O. We compute the exact probabilities of all possible Simpson–Kramer scores of O. The computations are independent of the shape of the distribution. The resulting expected score of O is an upper bound of the expected min–max score.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)145-149
Number of pages5
JournalMathematical social sciences
StatePublished - Nov 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • General Social Sciences
  • General Psychology
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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