Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

Hervé Crès; M. Utku Ünver

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.006

Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

Hervé Crès, M. Utku Ünver

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Consider a two-dimensional spatial voting model. A finite number m of voters are randomly drawn from a (weakly) symmetric distribution centered at O. We compute the exact probabilities of all possible Simpson–Kramer scores of O. The computations are independent of the shape of the distribution. The resulting expected score of O is an upper bound of the expected min–max score.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	145-149
Number of pages	5
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	90
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.006
State	Published - Nov 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.006

Cite this

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Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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