Trade negotiations, information and domestic politics: The role of domestic groups

Helen V. Milner, B. Peter Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A domestic ratification game nested within an international bargaining game establishes that domestic politics influences the outcome of international negotiations. When information on the domestic side is incomplete, an informational role of lobbies is established. Cooperation is more likely when domestic lobbies provide information to Congress about a treaty presented for ratification, especially when cooperation would not otherwise occur. As government becomes more divided, cooperation is less likely; when it does occur, the legislature is better off - internal divisions worsen the external leverage of states, while a united home front is the executive's best chance for obtaining her ideal agreement.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)145-189
    Number of pages45
    JournalEconomics and Politics
    Volume8
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1996

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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