TY - JOUR
T1 - Transplants and implants
T2 - The economics of self-improvement
AU - Burdett, Ken
AU - Coles, Melvyn G.
PY - 2001/8
Y1 - 2001/8
N2 - This article examines equilibrium self-improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two-sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated - some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self-improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self-improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain "acceptable." But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self-improvement.
AB - This article examines equilibrium self-improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two-sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated - some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self-improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self-improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain "acceptable." But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self-improvement.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0346756104&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1111/1468-2354.00126
DO - 10.1111/1468-2354.00126
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0346756104
SN - 0020-6598
VL - 42
SP - 597
EP - 616
JO - International Economic Review
JF - International Economic Review
IS - 3
ER -