Trees and extensive forms

Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Klaus Ritzberger

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002

Trees and extensive forms

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers "exotic" cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	216-250
Number of pages	35
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	143
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002
State	Published - Nov 2008

Keywords

Differential games
Extensive forms
Sequential decision theory
Trees

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002

Cite this

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Trees and extensive forms

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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