Trees and extensive forms

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers "exotic" cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)216-250
Number of pages35
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Nov 2008


  • Differential games
  • Extensive forms
  • Sequential decision theory
  • Trees

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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