Turf wars

Helios Herrera, Ernesto Reuben, Michael M. Ting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)143-153
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume152
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2017

Keywords

  • Bureaucracy
  • Competition
  • Information withholding
  • Jurisdiction
  • Organizations
  • Turf war

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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