Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)85-105
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2010


  • Interdependent values
  • Matching
  • Stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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