@article{059d48ede2ad4169821222ce6802ddfd,
title = "Two-sided matching with interdependent values",
abstract = "We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences.",
keywords = "Interdependent values, Matching, Stability",
author = "Archishman Chakraborty and Alessandro Citanna and Michael Ostrovsky",
note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank the Associate Editor, two anonymous referees, Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Dirk Bergemann, Francoise Forges, Drew Fudenberg, Christine Jolls, Emir Kamenica, John Lazarev, Dan Levin, Paul Milgrom, Muriel Niederle, Ariel Pakes, Parag Pathak, Andrew Postle-waite, Ronnie Razin, Al Roth, Michael Schwarz, Ilya Segal, Tayfun Sonmez, Adam Szeidl, Utku Unver, and Richard Zeckhauser for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper stems from and adds to results that previously circulated in two separate papers. Parts of the paper were completed while the second author was visiting Columbia Business School and the third author was visiting the Hoover Institution at Stanford. The first and the second authors acknowledge the financial support of NSF grant #0617850.",
year = "2010",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "145",
pages = "85--105",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",
}