TY - JOUR
T1 - Understanding European unemployment with a representative family model
AU - Ljungqvist, Lars
AU - Sargent, Thomas J.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Riccardo Colacito, Constantino Hevia, Kevin Kallock, Sagiri Kitao, and Alejandro Rodriguez for excellent research assistance. For useful comments on earlier drafts, we thank Gadi Barlevy, Marco Bassetto, Jeffrey Campbell, Mariacristina De Nardi, Wouter DenHaan, David Domeij, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Timothy Kehoe, Robert King, Narayana Kocherlakota, Dirk Krueger, Lisa Lynch, Edward C. Prescott, Richard Rogerson, François Velde, anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Georgetown University, New York University, the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and New York, ITAM, the Stockholm School of Economics, the University of Helsinki, the University of Oregon, and the European University Institute. We especially thank David Backus for his critical comments and suggestions. Ljungqvist's research was supported by a grant from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. Sargent's research was supported by a grant to the National Bureau of Economic Research from the National Science Foundation.
PY - 2007/11
Y1 - 2007/11
N2 - A representative family model with indivisible labor and employment lotteries has no labor market frictions and complete markets. Nevertheless, its aggregate responses to an increase in government supplied unemployment insurance (UI) and to an increase in microeconomic turbulence are qualitatively similar to those in two macromodels with labor market frictions and incomplete markets, namely, the matching and search-island models in Ljungqvist and Sargent [2007a. Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models. Journal of Monetary Economics, this issue]. Because there is no frictional unemployment in the representative family model, an increase in employment protection (EP) decreases aggregate work because the representative family substitutes leisure for work, an effect opposite to what occurs in matching and search-island models. Heterogeneity among workers highlights the economy-wide coordination in labor supply and consumption sharing that employment lotteries and complete markets achieve in the representative family model. A high disutility of labor makes generous UI cause very low employment levels.
AB - A representative family model with indivisible labor and employment lotteries has no labor market frictions and complete markets. Nevertheless, its aggregate responses to an increase in government supplied unemployment insurance (UI) and to an increase in microeconomic turbulence are qualitatively similar to those in two macromodels with labor market frictions and incomplete markets, namely, the matching and search-island models in Ljungqvist and Sargent [2007a. Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island models. Journal of Monetary Economics, this issue]. Because there is no frictional unemployment in the representative family model, an increase in employment protection (EP) decreases aggregate work because the representative family substitutes leisure for work, an effect opposite to what occurs in matching and search-island models. Heterogeneity among workers highlights the economy-wide coordination in labor supply and consumption sharing that employment lotteries and complete markets achieve in the representative family model. A high disutility of labor makes generous UI cause very low employment levels.
KW - Employment protection
KW - Lotteries
KW - Representative family
KW - Turbulence
KW - Unemployment insurance
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.09.002
DO - 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.09.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:36049026816
SN - 0304-3932
VL - 54
SP - 2180
EP - 2204
JO - Journal of Monetary Economics
JF - Journal of Monetary Economics
IS - 8
ER -