TY - JOUR
T1 - Understanding Self-Control as a Whole vs. Part Dynamic
AU - Fujita, Kentaro
AU - Carnevale, Jessica J.
AU - Trope, Yaacov
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments This work was funded by a grant from The John Templeton Foundation’s Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project. Special thanks to Timothy Schroeder, editor Neil Levy, and two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
PY - 2018/10/1
Y1 - 2018/10/1
N2 - Although dual-process or divided-mind models of self-control dominate the literature, they suffer from empirical and conceptual challenges. We propose an alternative approach, suggesting that self-control can be characterized by a fragmented part versus integrated whole dynamic. Whereas responses to events derived from fragmented parts of the mind undermine self-control, responses to events derived from integrated wholes enhance self-control. We review empirical evidence from psychology and related disciplines that support this model. We, moreover, discuss the implications of this work for psychology, neuroscience, economics, and philosophy. In particular, we highlight how this model addresses many of the conceptual and empirical short-comings of divided-mind models. We suggest that understanding self-control as the interplay between fragmented parts versus integrated wholes, moreover, provides novel insights and testable new hypotheses.
AB - Although dual-process or divided-mind models of self-control dominate the literature, they suffer from empirical and conceptual challenges. We propose an alternative approach, suggesting that self-control can be characterized by a fragmented part versus integrated whole dynamic. Whereas responses to events derived from fragmented parts of the mind undermine self-control, responses to events derived from integrated wholes enhance self-control. We review empirical evidence from psychology and related disciplines that support this model. We, moreover, discuss the implications of this work for psychology, neuroscience, economics, and philosophy. In particular, we highlight how this model addresses many of the conceptual and empirical short-comings of divided-mind models. We suggest that understanding self-control as the interplay between fragmented parts versus integrated wholes, moreover, provides novel insights and testable new hypotheses.
KW - Construal level theory
KW - Delay of gratification
KW - Self-control
KW - Self-governance
KW - Self-regulation
KW - Willpower
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U2 - 10.1007/s12152-016-9250-2
DO - 10.1007/s12152-016-9250-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84959077306
SN - 1874-5490
VL - 11
SP - 283
EP - 296
JO - Neuroethics
JF - Neuroethics
IS - 3
ER -