Uniform selection in global games

Sylvain Chassang

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.010

Uniform selection in global games

Sylvain Chassang

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	222-241
Number of pages	20
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	139
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.010
State	Published - Mar 2008

Keywords

Comparative statics
Endogenous games
Equilibrium selection
Global games
Uniform selection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.010

Cite this

@article{d84fd86e945144138331c5323112fa98,

title = "Uniform selection in global games",

abstract = "This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium.",

keywords = "Comparative statics, Endogenous games, Equilibrium selection, Global games, Uniform selection",

author = "Sylvain Chassang",

year = "2008",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.010",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "139",

pages = "222--241",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Uniform selection in global games

AU - Chassang, Sylvain

PY - 2008/3

Y1 - 2008/3

N2 - This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium.

AB - This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium.

KW - Comparative statics

KW - Endogenous games

KW - Equilibrium selection

KW - Global games

KW - Uniform selection

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38849126086&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=38849126086&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.010

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:38849126086

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 139

SP - 222

EP - 241

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -

Uniform selection in global games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this