Uniform selection in global games

Sylvain Chassang

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)222-241
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - Mar 2008


    • Comparative statics
    • Endogenous games
    • Equilibrium selection
    • Global games
    • Uniform selection

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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