Unilateral stability in matching problems

Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    The canonical solution concept used in matching problems is pairwise stability, whose premise is that harmony is disrupted by any two agents intentionally leaving their partners to be with each other. We instead focus on scenarios in which harmony is disrupted merely by a single agent unilaterally initiating contact with a member of a different pair, whether or not his approach is reciprocated. A variety of solution concepts are proposed in which taboos, status, or power systematically limit such initiatives in order to achieve harmony.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Article number105780
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    StatePublished - Mar 2024


    • Matching problems
    • Pairwise stability
    • Unilateral stability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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