Abstract
In recent years both philosophers and scientists have been sceptical about the existence of animal minds. This is in distinction to Hume who claimed that '...no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men'. I argue that Hume is correct about the epistemological salience of our ordinary practices of ascribing mental states to animals. The reluctance of contemporary philosophers and scientists to embrace the view that animals have minds is primarily a fact about their philosophy and science rather than a fact about animals. The recognition of this fact is the beginning of any serious effort to develop a science of cognitive ethology.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 79-102 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society |
Volume | 98 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1998 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy