Verifiable auctions for online ad exchanges

Sebastian Angel, Michael Walfish

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper treats a critical component of the Web ecosystem that has so far received little attention in our community: ad exchanges. Ad exchanges run auctions to sell publishers' inventory - space on Web pages - to advertisers who want to display ads in those spaces. Unfortunately, under the status quo, the parties to an auction cannot check that the auction was carried out correctly, which raises the following more general question: how can we create verifiability in low-latency, high-frequency auctions where the parties do not know each other? We address this question with the design, prototype implementation, and experimental evaluation of VEX. VEX introduces a technique for efficient, privacy-preserving integer comparisons; couples these with careful protocol design; and adds little latency and tolerable overhead.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the SIGCOMM 2013 and Best Papers of the Co-Located Workshops
Pages195-206
Number of pages12
Edition4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
EventAnnual Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication on the Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication, ACM SIGCOMM 2013 - Hong Kong, China
Duration: Aug 12 2013Aug 16 2013

Publication series

NameComputer Communication Review
Number4
Volume43
ISSN (Print)0146-4833
ISSN (Electronic)1943-5819

Other

OtherAnnual Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication on the Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication, ACM SIGCOMM 2013
CountryChina
CityHong Kong
Period8/12/138/16/13

Keywords

  • ad exchanges
  • online advertising
  • verifiable auctions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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  • Cite this

    Angel, S., & Walfish, M. (2013). Verifiable auctions for online ad exchanges. In Proceedings of the SIGCOMM 2013 and Best Papers of the Co-Located Workshops (4 ed., pp. 195-206). (Computer Communication Review; Vol. 43, No. 4). https://doi.org/10.1145/2534169.2486038